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Military Use of the GT200 T he GT200 device has been extensively used by the Mexican armed forces to remotely detect and identify substances such as drugs and explosives. A double blind experiment was performed to test its efficacy. In seventeen out of twenty attempts, the GT200 failed in the hands of certified operators to find more than 1600 amphetamine pills and four bullets hidden in a randomly chosen cardboard box out of eight identical boxes distributed within a 90 m × 20 m ballroom.
This result is compatible with the 1/8 efficacy expected for a useless device, and is incompatible with even a moderately effective working one.
Investigating the GT200
The GT200 is claimed by its manufacturer, U.K.-based Global Technical Ltd, to be a remote substance detector that may identify numerous substances in quantities as small as picograms and from distances as large as 5 km [1] . Documents obtained through the Mexican Federal Access to Information Institute (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información, (IFAI)), and from the web portals of several government agencies [2] , [3] show that the Mexican Government bought more than 940 of these devices at prices from $280 000MX to $580 000MX mexican pesos each (the exchange rate fluctuated around $13MX to $1USD). Its main users were the Mexican Army and Navy, with more than 742 and 102 units, respectively, followed by the state petroleum company with 54 units. According to press releases [4] , the GT200 was used successfully as a tool in the war against drugs, in hundreds of searches for cocaine, marijuana, etc. It was used at military checkpoints and at airports and justified house searches and detentions of an unknown number of citizens for presumed possession and trafficking of illegal substances. Nevertheless, the GT200 is one of a class of detectors based on dowsing rods with brand names such as Quadro Tracker, DKL-Lifeguard, Mole, Sniffex, and ADE651, which have invariably failed in controlled experiments 1 (see [5] , and references therein). W.Luis Mochán (WLM) participated as expert witness in a judicial trial where the GT200 provided multiple instances of evidence of drug and munition possession. Its operators included the "theory of operation of the apparatus" [6] in their statements, claiming it is sensitive to characteristic "diamagnetic and paramagnetic fields" produced by all substances, allowing their detection and identification, and that it is programmed through cards that are fed by "electrostatic energy" produced by its operators, among many other statements filled with pseudo-scientific jargon. WLM, asked to provide a detailed criticism of this theory [7] , concluded that "it contains numerous conceptual errors and meaningless statements that use scientific language but out of 1 context" and that "it is certain that the equipment is useless." This study was used in a different judicial trial in which the judge Karla Macías Lovera released Ernesto Cayetano, a man who had been accused of drug trafficking [8] and thus spent 8 months in jail. It has also been discussed within the Mexican Senate [9] , [10] , which exhorted the President of Mexico to order the scientific evaluation of the efficacy of the GT200 [11] .
Alejandro Ramírez (AR) participated as expert witness in another trial and was asked to determine the validity of the evidence provided by the GT200. The judge ordered the Army to provide a GT200 apparatus, an expert operator, enough quantity of a detectable substance and to participate in a test to be conducted by AR. Curiously, Arturo Menchaca, former president of the Mexican Academy of Science (Academia Mexicana de Ciencias, AMC) had offered help for testing the device; it was rejected so as not to violate the terms of the purchase contract (fragments of the corresponding letters are displayed in [9] ). The test, conducted by AR and WLM, was carried out on October 21, 2011, on the grounds of the AMC. Being part of a trial in progress, the results were not released at once. Nevertheless, about a year after the test, the trial showed no progress and the main results were published by a national newspaper [12] .
The purpose of this article is to describe the test and its results.
Test
We wrote down a meticulously detailed protocol, trying to make it as unambiguous as feasible. We wanted our results to be clear cut about the effectiveness of the detector and we wanted to avoid any kind of extraneous explanations and excuses beyond the ineffectiveness of the device, were it to fail the test. A description of the protocol and details of the test may be found in [13] , and an anecdotal account in [14] , [15] . Here we give a summary of the test.
The device was tested on Oct. 21, 2011, at an abandoned 90-m × 20-m ballroom within the grounds of the AMC (which occupy a palace built for a former police chief and later confiscated by the government). The sample to be searched consisted of 1630 30-mg capsules of Itrabil and 33 30-mg capsules of Obeclox, both with the substance Clorobenzorex, a stimulant drug of the phenethylamine and amphetamine chemical families. The rest of the sample consisted of 3 9-mm × 19-mm bullets and one 0.28-in (7.1-mm) bullet. The sample had presumably been detected using the GT200 and later confiscated from the house of Juanita Velázquez, defendant in the trial for which the experiment was ordered. Two policemen and two members of the army were in charge of safeguarding the sample but otherwise they didn't participate in the test. Another two members of the army were designated by the commander of the 24th military zone in the state of Morelos to participate as experts in the use, operation, and care of the GT200 molecular detector. The defense lawyer for the defendant and another member of the army participated as witnesses.
Before starting the experiment, the participants met at an empty office within the AMC to receive an explanation of the protocol. They would be divided into a hide (H) and a search (S) team, each with one soldier, one experimenter, and witnesses. To avoid electronic communications between the soldiers, they were asked to empty their pockets into bags that were kept in the office. A planned scan for electromagnetic waves was deemed unnecessary. To avoid conflicting remembrances of the test, each experimenter kept a journal and asked the soldier in his team to sign his agreement to each individual entry. To avoid damaging the equipment or contaminating the sample, the GT200 was operated exclusively by the soldier S S of the S team and the sample to be hidden and the boxes which would hide it would be manipulated exclusively by the soldier S H of the H team. Two video-cameras were positioned within the ballroom, facing each other to film the whole test and to monitor continuously its two entrances. Furthermore, the experimenters carried hand-held video-cameras. 2 After discussing the protocol and dividing the participants into teams, we proceeded to an examination of the area where the test was to take place. S H worried about inhabited houses close to the ballroom, as they might harbor medicines that could link energetically with the detector. Nevertheless, he decided the room was large enough to minimize their effects. On the other hand, he demanded the removal of a table with coffee and soft drinks. He also complained that the envelope in which the bag of amphetamines were brought smelled of marijuana and it would have contaminated the exterior of the bag which in turn would contaminate the boxes, but he agreed that the test could proceed after the sample was placed within a clean, tightly closed plastic bag.
The participants also examined the eight opaque cardboard boxes in which the sample was to be hidden. The soldiers agreed they were suitable for the experiment.
Before the test started the soldiers were asked to sign a document stating that they understood the conditions of the test and that they considered them adequate to detect the sample, described in detail, with the GT200, or else sign a document stating that they didn't expect the GT200 to function adequately under the stated conditions, thus terminating the test. They chose the first alternative.
We asked S H to place each box within the room at the positions of his choice, allowing enough space between them to permit detection of the substance in any of them, and the triangulation and all motions required for the successful operation of the device. S H decided to place the boxes along a straight line oriented east-west, at a distance of approximately 6 m from each other and at a distance of 10 m from the north and south walls (Figure 1) .
We divided the test into a calibration and a doubleblind stage.
During the calibration stage S H hid the sample within a box in plain view of all the participants and afterwards S S searched for it, and the procedure was repeated for successive boxes. Though we planned to hide the sample once in each one of the eight boxes, we had to cut this stage early, as S S claimed he was becoming very tired and that the GT200 wouldn't work if its operator were fatigued.
Before the double-blind stage, everybody, except the members of the H team left the ballroom. The S team entered a waiting room in a building adjacent to the ballroom while S H randomly assigned and placed each of eight labels AAA, AAS, ASA… SSS within each of the eight boxes. These labels actually correspond to the 8 numbers 0…7 written in binary but replacing 0 by A and 1 by S to permit choosing a box randomly by tossing a coin three times (in México the result of a coin toss is either águila (A) or sol (S)). The double-blind stage then proceeded as follows: 1) The experimenter E H of the H team chose one label randomly using the procedure above and S H hid the sample in the corresponding box. After he verified that all the boxes were in their designated positions and all the lids were properly closed, the H team left the room through its main entrance. E H knocked on the door of the waiting room and after allowing enough time the H team entered the waiting room. Meanwhile, the S team entered the ballroom from the annex through a lateral entrance. Thus, The GT200 is claimed by its manufacturer to be a remote substance detector.
no kind of contact took place between the members of both teams. 2) S S used his GT200 to identify the box presumably containing the sample, and, without opening it, placed an indicator on top of its lid. Then, the S team left the ballroom through its main entrance. The experimenter E S of the S team knocked on the door of the waiting room, to which the S team entered after allowing the H team time to enter the ballroom through the lateral entrance.
3) The H team recorded and signed forms indicating the actual location of the sample and the location identified by the GT200. 4) The steps above were repeated until 20 iterations were completed. After completion of all the iterations, the results were written out to a final form where all the participants signed their agreement.
By the end of the fifth iteration S S felt exhausted and claimed it would be impossible for him to proceed with the test. In order to be able to finish the test we decided to swap operators after each fifth trial. To reduce the distance to walk during each search, making it less tiresome, the soldiers suggested a new disposition for the boxes, making a zig-zag pattern with approximately 6 m between neighboring boxes, as shown in Figure 0 , and signed a statement declaring that the new disposition would not hinder the efficacy of detection.
Unfortunately, swapping operators allowed them to know the ongoing results before the test was finished, violating its strict double-blind character and leading to complaints and excuses for the numerous failed trials. However, the excuses were quite lame and we were able to deal with them and complete the test. For example, they complained about possible contamination with marijuana vapors (they were using a cannabis card in their GT200 to presumably enhance its detecting power), they claimed that climbing the stairs between the waiting room and the ballroom left them agitated (they were allowed unlimited rest periods and several breaks), they stated they required a trained companion dog to assist in their searches (we were testing the device, not the dogs), and they argued that the GT200 was not expected to point at a precise location (the manual stated the uncertainty was 2 m, less than the distance between boxes).
The times taken for each trial fluctuated from 4 min to 24 min, and we took four rest breaks [13] .
Remarks
This protocol was designed to account for the expected distrust among the participants. Information exchange between S H and S S had to be avoided; three bits of information could subvert a trial. Expected excuses for failures, such as accusing the experimenters of contaminating the boxes, had to be precluded. It was also important to convince the soldiers that the experimenters wouldn't trick them.
The number of boxes was chosen as 8 = 2³, so that three coin tosses could select a box randomly. The number of trials was chosen as 20, so that a detector not better than randomly choosing boxes would be unlikely to succeed in more than half of the trials (probability less than 10 −4 ), and a moderately efficient detector (with efficacy of 85% in each trial), would be as unlikely to fail in more than half the trials. Thus, success or failure would be clear cut.
The purpose of the calibration series, which we expected to be successful, was to eliminate excuses The number of illegal searches increased dramatically since the GT200 was adopted.
were the double blind series to fail, as the conditions during both series would be essentially identical.
Results
The results of the calibration stage were that the GT200 had correctly located the sample in four out of four attempts. The results of the double-blind stage were that the detector located the sample in three out of twenty attempts and failed in the remaining seventeen.
The calibration stage showed that the GT200 was perfectly capable of finding the sample when the operator knew beforehand the location where it had been hidden. The probability of obtaining this result by chance is (1/8) 4 ≈ 0.00024, negligible. Thus, this stage also showed that it couldn't be claimed that the experimental conditions (sample, boxes, envelopes, bags, neighbors, presence of researchers and witnesses, position of boxes, room, walls, weather, etc.) hampered the search. Given a detector with efficacy p, i.e., with a probability p of success in any one trial, the probability of having m successful trials out of N = 20 independent search attempts would be described by the binomial distribution b (p, m, N) . A completely ineffective detector would have chosen randomly between any of the 8 boxes, so would correspond to p = 1/8. The corresponding distribution has an average of m − = 2.5 and a standard deviation of Δm ≈ 1.5, and therefore is completely consistent with our experimental result m = 3 for the double blind stage. This contrasts even with a poorly effective detector, with an unacceptably low efficacy of p = 80%, for which m − = 16 and Δm ≈ 1.8, so our experimental result would be more than 7 standard deviations away from the mean, a result with a negligible probability b(. 8, 3, 20 (3/20,3,20) that the detector had an efficacy p, given that there were 3 successful searches in 20 trials. With a likelihood l(1/8) = 0.95 we can conclude that the detector was completely useless, while the likelihood l(p) of any p ≥ 0.5 is negligible, less than 0.005, and very rapidly decreasing (see inset).
Further Developments
The Mexican government payed about 350 million pesos for the acquisition of more than 940 molecular detectors [2] , though there are claims [16] that the actual number was 1112 units for about 450 million pesos. According to press releases issued during the years 2010 and 2011 (see for example [4] ) these devices were successfully used on an almost daily basis. They were used to justify searches in homes and schools, many times without judicial warrants [17] , and were employed at roadblocks yielding numerous detentions, trials, and imprisonments. The number of illegal searches increased dramatically since the GT200 was adopted, so the National Committee of Human Rights issued a recommendation declaring its use violates human rights [17] . According to Lemus [18] , more than 5000 people were imprisoned using the GT200 as main evidence and by mid-2015, 1980 of them remained in jail, 652 of them in federal prisons.
The resolution [11] agreed upon by the Senate in June, 2012, urging the President to order a scientific evaluation has not been complied with yet. Related resolutions presented to the House of Representatives and the Senate [16] , [19] , [20] urged the Attorney General to investigate the possibility of corruption in the purchase of these devices and to investigate the company that sold them (SegTec) for possible fraud. They also urged the Ministry of the Interior to publish the number of people that had been charged, judged, and imprisoned using evidence provided by the GT200 and the Foreign Relations Ministry to investigate the role played by the U.K. government and its former ambassador Paxman in the sale of the devices. These resolutions were ignored and were not even put to a vote [21] .
In Aug. 2012, the Mexican Supreme Court was involved in a case to evaluate the use of the GT200 to provide evidence: Two women were accused of trafficking drugs. The judge in charge of the case freed them using information contained in [7] to argue that the GT200 didn't provide scientific evidence. The Attorney General appealed the case and the Supreme Court stepped in. In Mar. 2013, the Attorney General gave up on the case before the Supreme Court could set a precedent.
In July 2012, Gary Bolton was charged in the United Kingdom for dishonestly representing the GT200 as capable of detecting explosives [22] , [23] and his case was taken to court. Similar accusations were brought at the time against the manufacturers of other similar detectors.
In Dec. 2012 the Mexican Attorney General announced it would discard its detectors [24] . We inquired for official documentation through IFAI but were told that it was non-existent.
The detector located the sample in three out of twenty attempts and failed in the remaining seventeen.
The first version of this article was made publicly available in Jan. 2013 through the ArXiv preprint server [13] . Shortly thereafter it was reviewed by the M.I.T. Technology Review [25] and it was promptly found by the police of London. That manuscript, the analysis of the GT200's technical data [7] , the video of our test [16] and other materials were provided as evidence in the trials against the manufacturers of the GT200 and similar devices that took place in London during 2013. WLM was invited as witness in the trial against Gary Bolton. James McCormick, manufacturer of the ADE651, was sentenced to 10 years in jail, Anthony Williamson (XK9) was declared guilty, Sam Tree (ALPHA6) was sentenced to 3.5 years in jail, and Joan Tree (ALPHA6) to 300 days of community work. Gary Bolton (GT200) was found guilty of fraud and sentenced in August 20, 2013 , to spend 7 years in jail.
In May 28, 2013, Griselda Saenz Orta, the judge that ordered the experimental test of the GT200, released the defendant Juanita Velázquez after having spent two years in jail [26] .
In July 2013, just after Gary Bolton was declared guilty, Mario Anguiano, then Governor of the State of Colima, declared to the press that his detectors ADE651 operated satisfactorily. WLM invited him publicly to test them [27] and he agreed. The test was conducted by Alfredo Aranda-Fernández, Dean of Science of the University of Colima, and by Ricardo Saenz, Director of its School of Science on Aug. 7, 2013. The results were that the ADE651 was also as ineffective as detection by chance, and those results were publicly announced by the Governor [28] .
In May, 2013, WLM gave Eduardo Sánchez, undersecretary of the Mexican Ministry of the Interior, spokesman of the Security Cabinet, and currently spokesman for the Presidency, an early version of this paper [13] and other relevant documents, and talked about the purchase and use of the detector, the ongoing trials in the U.K. against the manufacturers, and courses of action to take. In July he said in an interview that the GT200 was not used anymore to provide incriminatory evidence [29] . In a radio interview in Aug. 22, 2013 [30] , he said that their use had not been forbidden but that they wouldn't be used at all and that their purchases would be investigated. Nevertheless, no official statements followed this interview and some officials have contradicted him, for example, the Attorney General of the State of Chiapas [31] . There have been occasional reports on the use of GT200s in the States of Hidalgo (Oct. 2013), Chiapas (Dec. 2013), Oaxaca (Jan. 2014), San Luis Potosí (Mar. 2014), Quintana Roo (Apr. 2014), and Chiapas (Feb., 2015) to search for bombs. Recent terrorist attacks in the Middle East [32] illustrate the enormous danger inherent in the use of these devices to search for explosives.
Conclusions
In our test, the GT200 proved to be a completely ineffective detector, only as good as detection by chance, when its operators were ignorant of where the sample had been hidden. However when they knew the location of a sample, the device appeared to pick the correct location consistently. Thus, the GT200 is necessarily manipulated by its user to point towards the location where he expects the sample to be hidden, although he may be unaware of this manipulation. The GT200 itself provides no information about the location of the sample, even when used by trained and certified operators, contrary to the claim that it could detect and identify nanograms (and even picograms) of hundreds of substances from distances as far away as hundreds or even thousands of meters; in this test, we used more than a kilogram of pills containing amphetamines and four bullets, and the sample was known to be hidden in one out of eight boxes not farther away than 100 m (presumably the sample had previously been detected within a house from outside and was used as evidence against its dweller). Thus, we conclude that the GT200 is worthless as a substance detector.
Our experiment was extremely simple and straightforward; its only subtleties lie in its double-blind character and the need to safeguard the results from the desires and expectations of the participants. It is awkward that similar experiments were not performed before the purchase of the detectors and that the purchase contracts included clauses to avoid experiments from taking place. There are reports of thousands of citizens imprisoned based on "evidence" provided by this fake device. In some cases further evidence has been provided, although that additional evidence was questionable as it was secured during incursions into homes without judicial warrants, not following proper protocols. The GT200 has been responsible for a systematic violation of human rights. Although the use of the devices decreased after its manufacturer was imprisoned, no reparations have been awarded to its victims in Mexico, many of whom In our test, the GT200 proved to be a completely ineffective detector... when its operators were ignorant of where the sample had been hidden. continue in prison. As far as we know, no reparations have been demanded either from the manufacturer or from the seller, and no public inquiry into the purchase has been initiated.
Using this case, it has been argued [33] that the low impact of Mexican science in government and policy circles is also due to the self-censorship of its scientific community. Proactive, more politically involved scientific institutions could act as safeguards against these kind of fraudulent (non)technologies. The GT200 affair illustrates the cost to developing countries of not having a strong scientific community willing and capable of influencing governmental decision making, and illustrates the cost to their societies of the lack of scientific culture that could allow decision makers to differentiate skillful sales demonstrations from controlled scientific experiments. Science is not a luxury for developing countries; their governments and societies should rely on science.
